Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1999

Charles Young Warner v. Patsy Evelyn Warner :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David S. Dolowitz; Cohne, Rappaport & Segal; Attorneys for Respondent/Appellant.
Harold G. Christensen; Rodney R. Parker; Heather S. White; Snow, Christensen & Martineau;
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appelle.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Warner v. Warner, No. 991031 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1999).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2454

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

David S. Dolowitz (Bar No. 0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
525 East 100 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Facsimile: (801) 355-1813
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHARLES YOUNG WARNER,

]

Petitioner/Appellee,

]
)

Civil No. 991031CA

v.
PATSY EVELYN WARNER,

]
)
]

Respondent/Appellant,

Priority No.: 15

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
AppealfromJudgment of the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County,
State of Utah
The Honorable Ray M. Harding, Jr.
Third District Court Judge
DAVIDS. DOLOWITZ (Bar No. 0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN
RODNEY R. PARKER
HEATHER S. WHITE
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
|-|-%
C | i
Salt Lake City, UT 84tel L t U
Utah Court of Appeals

MAY 2 2 2000
Julia D'Alesandro
Clerk of the Court

David S. Dolowitz (Bar No. 0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
525 East 100 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Facsimile: (801) 355-1813
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHARLES YOUNG WARNER,
Petitioner/Appellee,
Civil No. 991031CA
PATSY EVELYN WARNER,
Respondent/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from Judgment of the
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County,
State of Utah
The Honorable Ray M. Harding, Jr.
Third District Court Judge
DAVIDS. DOLOWITZ (Bar No. 0899)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008

HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN

RODNEY R. PARKER
HEATHER S. WHITE
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTION

2

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

2

STANDARD OF REVIEW

2

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL

2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3,4

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4, 5,6,7, 8,9,10

ARGUMENT

10,11,12,13,14,15,16

APPELLANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED A CONTINUATION
OF HER ALIMONY

10

CONCLUSION

17

ADDENDUM

19

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bolligerv.Bolliger. 2000 UT App., f s 10, 11-13, 14 -16, 19 - 398 UT. Adv. Rep. 11, 12
2, 4, 13, 14, 15, 16
Durfee v. Durfee.

4

State v. Jacobv. 1999 UT App. 521J 10, 975 P.2d, 939

4,11

Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1998)

4,11

Johnson v. Johnson. 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993)

14, 15

Navlorv.Navlor. 700 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985)

12

Haslam v. Haslam. 1982 UT 657 P.2d 757U

14, 15

Munns v. Munns. 790 P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990)

14,15

STATUTES
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(l) and (2)

3,10

U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)

2

iii

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this matter is vested in this Court pursuant to the provisions of § 782a-3(2)(h) of Utah Code Annotated.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Is the trial court ruling that no significant unexpected change of circumstances had
occurred which required continuation of the payment of alimony by Appellee to
Appellant in error?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
""The determination of the trial court that there [has or has not] been
a substantial change of circumstances ... is presumed valid...'" and we
review the ruling under an abuse of discretion and standard. Moon v.
Moon, 1999 UT App. 121f 28, 973 P.2d 431 (alteration in original)
(citations omitted), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 89 (Utah 1999)."
Bolligerv.Bolliger. 2000 UT App. 47, Tf 10, 398 Utah Adv. Rep. 11,12.
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL
The issues presented in this appeal were preserved as they were presented in
Appellant's trial brief (R.279-270), Appellee's trial brief (R. 287-280) and were the issues
ruled upon by the trial court (R. 294-288). Initially, these issues were presented in
Appellant's Petition to continue alimony (R. 89-90), Appellee's Motion to Dismiss (R.
146-148), Appellant's Amended Petition to Continue Alimony (R. 165-166) and the
Answer to the Amended Petition (R. 169-171).

Page 2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are two potential views of this case. The Decree itself provides that the
Appellant had a right to petition to extend alimony:
"...based upon a material change in the financial circumstances of the parties."
(R.82).
The statute governing alimony [§ 30-3-5 of the Utah Code] in effect when this
decree was entered has been amended several times since the entry of the Decree.
Section 30-3-5(7)(g)(i)-(ii) of the Utah Code was in effect when this matter was decided
by the trial court provides:
(i)

The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes
and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial.material
change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of divorce.

(ii)

The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony
to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the
decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances
that justify the action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The trial court found each of the factors the Appellant asserted constituted a
significant change of circumstances were to be true; (R. 291-290) however, ruled they
did not constitute a significant change in circumstances justifying the continuation of
alimony (R. 290). Appellant requests this Court to correct that error.
The trial court faced and resolved two questions in rendering this decision. The
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first was whether to apply the law of the case as incorporated into the Decree of Divorce
that a change of circumstances justifying the continuation of the alimony alone was
sufficient to continue alimony. State v. Jacobv. 1999 UT App 52, If 10, 975 P.2d 939,
942; and Wilde v. Wilde. 969 P.2d 438, 442, (Utah App 1998). After resolving this
question against Appellant, the Court ruled she would be required to meet the current
statutory and case law test of showing a material change of circumstances had occurred
since entry of the decree not contemplated in the decree itself, Bolliger v. Bolliger. Id. at
f s 11, 12, & 13. (Quoting Durfee v. Durfee. 796 P.2d 713, (Utah. App. 1990).
The final ruling of the trial court was that all events alleged by Appellant were
proven by her but they did not constitute a material change in circumstances. (R. 290).
The actual test utilized is only important if this Court finds that decision to be an abuse of
discretion.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the time the parties were divorced, they entered into a Stipulation (R. 38-14)
which was entered into the Decree of Divorce. Paragraph 7 of the Stipulation provided
for alimony (R. 34-33). It stated in relevant part:
"Appellee would pay to the Appellant as alimony $7,917.00 per month
as alimony until the Appellee reached the age of sixty-five (65) unless
Appellant filed a Petition to Extend Alimony based upon a material change
in the financial circumstances of the parties."
(R34-33). This language tracked through and became part of the Decree of Divorce (R.
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82-83). On May 3, 1999, prior to Appellee's sixty-fifth (65th) birthday, Appellant filed a
Petition requesting the court to continue alimony (R. 90-89).
The issue of what law was applicable to govern this Petition was raised
immediately by Appellee in a Motion to Dismiss (R. 148-146). Appellant responded by
asserting that the law of the case governed (R. 162-158). The trial court, after hearing
argument on what was the applicable law, directed the filing of an amended petition (R.
173-172). Appellant complied with the Court's direction. (R. 166-164). The issue that
came before the Court for trial was whether or not there had been a substantial-change of
circumstances not anticipated at the time of the entry of the Decree which required the
court to order the continuation of alimony.
The Appellant asserted there had been five changes in circumstances which
required the continuation of alimony:
1.

The Appellant received nothing for her interest in Collusion Safety
Engineering and less than 53% of the value of the assets awarded to her
while the Appellee has received a minimum of $ 150,000.00;

2.

Appellant opened an art gallery from which she expected to support herself
but it failed;

3.

Appellant did not develop a significant ability to earn income during the
marriage and while that was known at the time of the entry of the decree,
what was not known was that she would not be able to earn anything above
reasonable seasonal minimum wage if the art gallery failed;

4.

Appellant was not able to support herself from the proceeds from the art
gallery which she thought she could;
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5.

Appellee did not retire but is in fact earning the same or more income than
he earned at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce.

(R. 90-89, 166-164). The evidence established that each of the five (5) alleged changes in
circumstance had occurred (R. 291-290), yet the trial court found this insufficient to
justify amending the Decree to continue alimony (R. 290).
When the Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter the parties had been
married for thirty-four (34) years. (Tr.13)1. Appellant did not desire the divorce, but it
occurred (Tr.13). The Appellant worked to support the Appellee and their family while
the Appellant obtained his education: first a bachelor's degree, then a masters degree in
mechanical engineering, followed by a Ph. D. (Tr.13 & 14). Appellant earned a high
school education (R. 14). She did not pursue further education because the parties agreed
that she was to stay at home with the children once they were bom (Tr. 14). While
Appellant did take some college classes, she was not able to attend school not only
because of the agreement but because the parties did not have the money to pay for child
care in order for her to pursue an education. (Tr.14).
Prior to the divorce, the parties had discussed the Appellant's opening an art
gallery in Springdale Utah (Tr.14.). She did open that gallery intending to support herself
with the gallery after the Divorce and put away some funds for retirement (Tr. 14, 40).

1

The full transcript is contained within the record reference 313. Consequently,
Appellant will simply refer to transcript pages as all referenced would otherwise refer back to (R.
313) which would not be of great assistance to the Court.
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Unfortunately, this business failed (Tr.14-15). Consequently, the business which the
Appellant thought she could operate to support herself after the Decree failed and she was
not able to produce income to support herself (Tr. 33).
The Decree of Divorce provided that certain assets were to be awarded to the
Appellant specifically including:
"Collision Safety Engineering $281,712.00." (R. 65).
Appellant did not receive cash in this sum (Tr.15). She did receive stock but she cannot
sell it, has received no dividends from it and it has no value to her (Tr.16). On the other
hand, Appellee received at least $150,000.00 for his stock as a result of a corporate
reorganization (Tr. 59).
Appellant received an asset entitled CAP Development which was valued at
$65,000.00 (Tr.16). She did not receive $65,000.00 from CAP Development. She has
received enough in dividends to pay the taxes that are due because of undistributed
earnings from CAP Development (which is now known as Incline) (Tr.17). Appellant is
not involved with the management of Incline and has no ability to sell her interest in that
entity unless her children were to purchase the stock as they manage Incline (Tr.17-18).
Appellant has never received anythingfromIncline except enough money to pay taxes
due on imputed income (Tr. 18).
The assets received by the Appellant were summarized on Exhibit Three (3). The
home in Springdale, Utah, and the retirement accounts were all that she received of any
Page 7

substance. Appellant received nothing of value to her for 48% of the assets awarded to
her (Tr. 29 - 30). The sum of these events, that is the failure to receive funds from the
assets and the failure of the business, has left Appellant unable to support herself as she
has no source of income except alimony (Tr. 33).
Appellant underwent a vocational assessment to determine what she was capable
of earning. By Stipulation, the report of Pat Arttus-Doherty was received into evidence as
Exhibit " 1 " (Tr. 4). Ms. Doherty advised the Court that the Appellant could earn
approximately $5.50 each hour which would produce $11,440.00 gross income per year.
Ms. Arttus-Doherty advised the Court that Appellant was qualified for only clerical work
because of physical and educational limitations which Appellant verified (Ex. 1, Tr.2022).
After the art gallery failed, Appellant did not go to work because the income that
she could earn would be between $6.00-$8.00 an hour on a seasonal basis and she felt she
could be taking a job from someone who had no income which Appellant did not believe
would be fair (Tr.20-21).
Appellant has loaned some of these funds to her son. She expected to be re-paid
(Tr.26-27). Unfortunately, those funds are not earning any money in the form of interest
on capital depreciation while loaned to her son (Tr.27). When re-paid she will put the
funds back into the American Express Retirement Account (Tr.27-28).
All of the funds available to the Appellant, if brought together and invested, would
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be valued at a little over $300,000.00 (Tr.29). This assumes no value for Collision Safety
Engineering and Incline (Tr.29-30).
The Appellant believed that her living expenses were still the same now as at the
time of the Divorce (Tr.42). As her funds invested cannot produce enough income to
support her and using them for her support will quickly exhaust them, Appellant is in
need of the alimony being continued, Exhibit "5" (Tr.30-34) as she had no income but the
alimony (Tr. 33).
The Appellant testified on cross-examination that she did some work for Collision
Safety Engineering prior to the divorce but that terminated with the divorce and the job
appeared to be one that was created for her (Tr.37-39). The Appellant did want to be
employed at the time of the divorce to run the art gallery (Tr.39) but not after it failed (Tr.
41-42).
Appellant testified she had no present intention to be employed unless she had to
because her application experience has led to her being advised that because of her age,
employers would only be interested in employing her on a part-time, seasonal basis
(Tr.40-41).
There has been no real change in the circumstances of Appellee. He continues on
the adjunct faculty at Brigham Young University (Tr.50) and while his interest and the
interest of some other members of family in Collusion Safety Engineering have been
purchased, he continues to work at the same business (Tr.52-55). Appellee received
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approximately $150,000.00 for his interest in Collusion Safety Engineering (Tr.59) while
Appellant received nothing from the sale of those assets (Tr.60). The income of the
Appellee in 1998 was $401,000.00 (Tr.60).
ARGUMENT

APPELLANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED A CONTINUATION
OF HER ALIMONY
The trial court determined the factual assertions made by the Appellant were all
correct yet did not constitute a change in circumstances; thus she was not entitled to
continuation of her alimony. That error must be reversed by this Court. In evaluating
Appellant's assertions this Court first should determine whether the test that the Appellant
was required to meet in her Petition to Continue Alimony was that stated in the Decree of
Divorce:
...based on a material change in the financial circumstances of the parties, (R. 82)
or the present statutory test of §30-3-5(7)(g)(l) and (2) of the Utah Code.
It is Appellant's position that the law of the case as contained within the Decree of
Divorce should have governed all that was necessary for her to establish to continue her
alimony was that there be a material change in the financial circumstances of the parties
so long as she petitioned the Court before the Appellee's sixty-fifth (65th) birthday.
There is no disagreement that she filed before Appellee's sixty-fifth (65th)
birthday. The findings of the trial court that:
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1.

The Appellant received nothing but stock which has no value to her for
interest in Collusion Safety Engineering while Appellee has received at
least $150,000.00;

2.

The art gallery which she intended to operate and support herself at the time
of the Decree has failed;

3.

She developed no significant ability to earn any income during the
marriage; and

4.

Appellee has not only not retired but is continuing to earn substantial
income constitute a material change in financial circumstances justifying
continuation of the alimony.

To apply a different criteria from those enunciated in the Decree would be
analogous to applying a statute that changes substantive rights of the parties. This would
be unconstitutional. As noted by this Court in State v. Jacoby, 1999 UT App. 52, f 10,
975 P.2d. 939 and stated fully by this Court in Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438 (Utah App.
1998):
Moreover statutory enactments which "effect substantive or vested rights
generally operate only prospectively." Department of Soc. Serv. v. Higgs,
656 P.2d 998, 1000 (Utah 1982); see generally Barron's Law Dictionary,
381 (3d ed. 1991) (defining "prospective" as law applicable only after date
it was enacted or decided). However, if a statutory amendment is deemed
procedural or remedial, then it applies to all actions - those which have
accrued or are pending (pending from time of commencement until final
determination), and to future actions. See Moore v. American Coal Co.,
737 P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1987); Higgs, 656 P.2d 1001. In other words, a
statute may be applied retroactively "if it affects only procedure and not
substantive rights." Washington National Insurance Company v.
Sherwood Assoc, 795 P.2d 665, 667 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)."
Wilde. 969 P.2d at 442 (1998). After this relocation, the Wilde. Court then
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went on to state:
A substantive law "creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of the
parties which may give rise to a cause of action." Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv.
Co,, 956 P. 2d 257, 260. (Utah 1998) (citations omitted). When the legislature
amends a statute, we presume that it intends the amendment "to change existing
legal rights." Id., or "simply clarify[s] the legislature's previous intentions."
Washington Nat'l 795 P.2d 669. Procedural statutes do not "enlarge, eliminate,
or destroy vested or contractual rights." Moore, 737 P.2d at 990 (citations
omitted). Moreover, a court should narrowly draw [] the boundaries of what
constitutes a procedural statute. Olsen, 956 P.2d at 261."
969P.2dat442."
The language of the Decree of Divorce provides:
"...if defendant has not remarried and has not filed a petition to extend alimony
based upon a material change in the financial circumstances of the parties."
This states the test for continuation of alimony that should have been applied by the trial
court. It is less stringent than that articulated in Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 797 (Utah
1985), the then existing law as of the date of entry of the Decree and the present statutory
standard of § 30-3-5(7)(g)(l) and (2). Under Naylor, Appellant would have had to have
alleged and proven that the change in circumstances was not only material but was not
anticipated at the time of the entry of the Decree:
"On a petition for modification of a divorce decree, the threshold requirement for
relief is a showing of a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the
entry of the decree and not contemplated in the Decree itself."
Naylor. 700 P.2d at 710. This is more strict than the language of the Decree but less
stringent than the test that now exists.
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Application of the standard stated in the Decree clearly required alimony to be
continued where the facts were that the art gallery failed, Appellee did not only not retire
but was earning more income than at the time of the entry of the Decree and Appellant
receiving nothing for 48% of the assets purportedly awarded to her while Appellee has
received substantial funds from his equivalent portion of those assets and remained
employed. Appellant is not able to support herself because of the failure of her business
and Appellee has not retired nor suffered any substantial reduction in income; this alone
should have required the trial court to continue the alimony award.
If, however, this Court determines that it should apply the criteria of the present
statute, the most recent statement by this Court of the applicable criteria is contained in
Bolliger, where, this Court declared:
To succeed on a Petition to Modify a Divorce Decree, the moving party must first
show that a substantial, material change of circumstances has occurred"" since
entry of the Decree and not contemplated in the Decree itself."
Id at TI11.
Also in Bolliger. this Court articulated what is meant by "contemplated by the
Divorce Decree":
The fact that the parties may have anticipated [a substantial change
of circumstances] in their own minds or in their discussions does not
mean that the decree itself contemplates the change. In order for a
material change in circumstances to be contemplated in a divorce
decree there must be evidence, preferably in the form of a provision
within the decree itself, that the trial court anticipated the specific
change.
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Durfee, 796 P.2d at 716. Accordingly, if both the divorce decree and the record
are bereft of any reference to the changed circumstances at issue in the Petition to
Modify, then the subsequent changed circumstance was not contemplated in the
original divorce decree.
See Bolliger. id. at Tf 13. Appellant believes that the facts she established required the
Court to continue her alimony but the trial court abused its discretion and rejected her
continuation.
In Bolliger. this Court reviewed the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court in
Haslam v. Haslam. 657 P.2d 757 (Utah 1982), and its prior decisions of Munns v. Munns,
790 P.2d 116 (Utah App. 1990) and Johnson v. Johnson. 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993).
Id. at ^f's 14-19. The opinion observed from those decisions that events at retirement can
constitute a material change of circumstances. This is true if income changes, Bolliger,
supra, and Haslam. supra, or if it was improperly anticipated Munns. supra, or was not
properly considered Johnson, supra. That rationale applies to the instant matter where the
Appellee anticipated his income declining but it has remained the same and possibly even
increased while the Appellant did not receive everything she was expected to receive and
the business with which she anticipated supporting herself failed. These events are
clearly a material change of circumstances not anticipated at the time of the entry of the
Decree of Divorce.
This fact patterns as Appellant pointed out to the trial court, is similar to Naylor v.
Naylor. 700 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985) where Mrs. Naylor was not able to earn what she
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thought she would earn and Dr. Naylor was successful by practicing his profession.
Under those facts, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed an increase and continuation of
alimony. This analysis was rejected by the trial court even though it noted that in Naylor.
the Utah Supreme Court found those were appropriate circumstances in which to continue
alimony (Tr. 293-289).
In Bolliger. this Court in discussing the authority of its prior decision in Munns. v.
Munns. supra, noted that it had reversed a decision automatically terminating alimony on
the receipt of social security (Id- If's 17 & 18) and Johnson v. Johnson, supra, where the
failure to consider retirement income was an error. (Id. ^ 19). In conjunction with the
examination of the Haslam decision (Id. f's 14 -16), it is clear that there must be a
reexamination of financial circumstances at retirement. The trial court erroneously
rejected the criteria set by the parties in their Decree for that reexamination. Whether this
Court agrees with this assertion or with the trial court's application of the present statute,
the trial court's determination that no change occurred justifying continuation of the
alimony is clearly erroneous. Appellee did not retire and still earns substantial income.
On the other hand, Appellant was unable to earn the income she had anticipated and did
not receive all assets contemplated within the Decree.
The trial court recognized in its ruling that the Appellant asserted five (5) changes
of circumstances had occurred which required the Court to continue her alimony:
1.

That as part of her property settlement agreement she received stock
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for her interest in Collision Safety Engineering, a company her
husband started, and that parts of the original company had been sold
off.
2.

That after the divorce she opened an art gallery but the gallery failed
shortly thereafter.

3.

That she did not develop a significant ability to earn income during
the marriage.

4.

That she thought she could support herself with the proceeds from
the art gallery and the property she received in the divorce
settlement, but now these proceeds are insufficient.

5.

That the Petitioner has not retired and is earning substantially the
same income that he earned at the time of the divorce.

(R. 291-290).
The court found all of these were established as true from the evidence presented by
Appellant but ruled that these did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances
justifying a continuation of alimony (R. 291-290). The court ruled this was true whether it
used a test of a change in circumstances not foreseen at the time of the divorce as required
by the statute or by the terms of the decree (R. 290). That error is clear under the
authorities examined by this Court and the decision itself in Bolliger. Based on that
authority, this Court must reverse the trial court and order continuation of Respondent's
alimony.
As Appellant's testimony was clear that her need was the same as existed at the
time of the entry of the Decree (Tr. 42, Exhibit 5), her alimony should have been
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continued at the existing rate until the death of either of the parties or further order of the
Court. Bolliger. 200 Utah App. 47, ^ 23.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the trial court, order the continuation of alimony of the
Appellant at the level at which it had been paid since entry of the Decree of Divorce.
This Court should award the Appellant the attorney's fees that she incurred in
bringing this matter before this Court and remand for determination of the appropriate
attorney's fees that should have been awarded to her for trial, as they were denied by the
trial court based on her lack of success on the merits.

DATED this

day of May, 2000.

DAVID S. DOLOWITZ
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C, 525 East 100 South, Suite 500, Salt Lake City,
Utah 84102, and that on the

*"

day of May, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy

of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be hand-delivered to:

Harold G. Christensen
Snow, Christensen& Martineau
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
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MLLU
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
/ O - ^ f e - ^ s ^ . Dupiity
^

CHARLES YOUNG WARNER,
Plaintiff/ Petitioner,

RULING

vs.
PATSY EVELYN WARNER,
Defendant / Respondent.

Case No. CV 88-367
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr.

This matter comes before the Court on Respondent's Petition to Continue Alimony. The
Court has reviewed and considered the file, the parties' memoranda, and the evidence adduced both
through testimony and through exhibits offered and received at trial, and now being fully advised in
the premises hereby issues the following:
RULING
The parties' Divorce Decree was entered into by stipulation in which the parties agreed that
alimony would terminate when the Plaintiff reached age 65, unless the Respondent "filed a petition to
extend alimony based upon a material change in the financial circumstances of the parties." The
Respondent filed her Petition to Extend Alimony on May 3, 1999, and the Court held a hearing on
the Petition on October 6, 1999.
This Court must first decide whether the Utah Code or the parties' Divorce Decree provides
the standard that this Court must apply in considering a modification of the alimony award. Wile the
parties' Decree states that alimony may be modified "based upon a material change in the financial
circumstances of the parties," the statute provides a different standard. It states:
(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders
regarding alimony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.

(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address
needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i)-(ii). Therefore, the issue is whether under contract theory the
Court is bound by the parties' stipulation regarding the standard for modifying alimony, or whether,
under its equitable powers, the Court should disregard the parties' stipulation and apply the statutory
standard.
After carefully considering the statutory and case law on this issue the Court finds that it is
not bound by the parties' stipulation, but should apply the statutory standard. A court is not bound
by the parties' stipulation regarding alimony, child custody, or child support. Utah law mandates
that courts have continuing, equitable discretion to modify awards of alimony, id, and child support
or custody, id at § 30-3-5(3). Utah courts have interpreted these statutes to provide that a court is
not bound by the parties' stipulation regarding alimony, child support or child custody because a
court has equitable power to modify these awards. The Utah Supreme Court announced this
principle as early as 1953 when it stated:
It is therefore reasonable to assume that the law was intended to give courts power to
disregard the stipulations or agreements of the parties in the first instance and enter
judgment for such alimony or child support as appears reasonable and to thereafter
modify such judgments when change of circumstances justifies it, regardless of
attempts of the parties to control the matter by contract. Under the authorities herein
cited such a view seems to be generally if not universally adhered to by the courts.
Callister v. Callister, 261 P.2d 944, 948-49 (Utah 1953).
The Utah Supreme Court followed the analysis of Callister in Naylor v. Navlor, 700 P.2d
707, 709-10 (Utah 1985), where it held that the trial court had the power to modify the alimony
provision of the decree by increasing the amount and extending the duration of payments even
though the parties had stipulated to $500.00 alimony for five years.
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The confusion between contract theory and equity seems to arise from the case of Kinsman v.
Kinsman, 748 P.2d 210 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In Kinsman, the Utah Court of Appeals relied on
contract theory to modify the alimony provision of a divorce decree where the parties stipulated that
"neither party is entitled to alimony and both parties hereby waive the same now and forever." Id at
211. However, the court's reliance on contract theory is explained by the fact that the court actually
viewed the case as dealing with a property settlement in addition to alimony. Besides waiving
alimony, the stipulation in Kinsman required that the defendant husband was to assume certain debts.
However, nine months after the divorce he filed bankruptcy and those debts were discharged, forcing
his wife to pay them off. The plaintiff then filed a motion to modify the decree to award alimony,
which the district court granted. In affirming the award of alimony, the Court of Appeals stated that
"[ajffirmance is based on a contract theory." Id at 212. The court viewed the promise to pay off
the debts, as part of the property settlement, as a condition precedent to the waiver of alimony.
Because the defendant failed to perform his obligation to pay off the debts, the plaintiff was relieved
of her obligation to waive alimony. The court stated, "[w]e decline to hold that a change of
circumstances can overcome a knowing and specific waiver in a stipulation." Id
The Supreme Court clarified the distinction between equity governing alimony and contract
theory governing property settlement in Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526, 527 (Utah 1981), where
the court stated:
Defendant has failed to observe the distinction between those cases involving the
statutory power of a court in a divorce proceeding to enter orders concerning support
and those cases in which the parties in a divorce action have settled their property
rights by agreement, the terms of which are incorporated in a decree.
The court explained that equity must recognize a property settlement agreement and cannot reinstate
rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because one has come to regret the bargain
made. Id (quoting Land v. Land. 605 P.2d 1248, 1250-51 (Utah 1980)). The law limits the
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continuing jurisdiction of the court when a property settlement agreement has been incorporated into
the decree. IcL However, the court continued, "[i]n this matter, we deal with child support which is
always open to the court's power of modification (even though set by stipulation), upon a proper
showing of a change in circumstances." Id. at 529.
Further explaining the difference between stipulations regarding property settlement and
those regarding equitable matters such as alimony or child custody, the Utah Court of Appeals
explained in Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), a child custody case, that
"Despain and Kinsman apply a contract theory to property distribution issues. Such a theory is
inapplicable to issues which involve the continuing, equitable powers of the court, as here." As a
result, the court found that the trial court was not bound by the parties' stipulation regarding
custody. Id.
Therefore, while a court may be bound by a stipulation regarding property settlement, this
Court is not bound by the parties' stipulation regarding alimony because Utah Code Ann. §30-35(7)(g)(i) gives the Court continuing equitable jurisdiction to modify alimony. Therefore, the Court
is not bound by the parties' stipulation and must apply the statutory standard which requires a party
to show "a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce."

II
The Respondent presented the following evidence in support of her claim that there had been
a substantial material change in circumstances:
1) That as part of the property settlement agreement she received stock for her
interest in Collision Safety Engineering, a company her husband started, and that parts
of the original company have been sold off.
2) That after the divorce she opened na art gallery but the gallery failed shortly
thereafter.
3) That she did not develop a significant ability to earn income during the marriage.
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4) That she thought she could support herself with the proceeds from the art gallery
and the property she received in the divorce settlement, but now these proceeds are
insufficient.
5) That the Petitioner has not retired and is earning substantially the same income that
he earned at the time of the divorce.
The Court finds that none of these situations constitute a substantial material change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce, as required by the statute. Furthermore, the
Court finds that none of these situations even rises to the level of a substantial material change in
circumstances. Therefore, Respondent's Petition fails even under the standard to which the parties'
stipulated in their Decree.
The Respondent contends that the facts of the Navlor case are substantially similar to the
instant case and that it should therefore control. In Navlor, the court increased and extended
alimony based on the fact that the petitioner's income had more than doubled since the time of the
divorce while the respondent's income had remained approximately the same, although the parties'
expected that her income would increase because of her hairdressing business. 700 P.2d at 710. The
court stated that "[t]he fact that this expectation, which was a predicate for the original support
order, has not been fulfilled constitutes a material change in circumstances." Id The court also
observed that Mrs. Naylor agreed to a limited term of alimony because she anticipated that she
would make enough to support herself through her hairdressing business. Id
However, Navlor is inapposite because in that case the original alimony award was predicated
upon the success or failure of the respondent's hairdressing business; whereas, in the instant case, the
alimony award was not predicated upon the success or failure of Respondent's art gallery. It does
not appear that alimony was intended to simply supplement Mrs. Warner's income until her art
gallery became successful. Rather, Mrs. Warner received $7,917.00 a month for almost eleven years,
totaling more than one million dollars. Furthermore, Mrs. Warner's own actions show that the
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alimony award was not conditioned on the success or failure of her art gallery. She opened the
gallery shortly after the divorce and it failed within a year, yet she continued to live on the same
amount of alimony and did not file her petition to modify alimony until ten years later. In contrast to
Naylor, the limited term of alimony in the Warner's Decree was not premised on the parties'
expectation that the Respondent's business would be successful. Therefore, the failure of the art
gallery does not constitute a substantial material change in circumstances.
Because Respondent has not met her burden under the statute to show a substantial material
change in circumstances, she is not entitled to a modification of the original alimony award.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby rules as follows:
1.

Respondent's Petition to Continue Alimony is DENIED,

2.

Counsel for Petitioner shall prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an

Order consistent with the terms of this Ruling and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to
form prior to submission to the Court for signature, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of
Judicial Administration.

DATED this ^ h

day of October, 1999.
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